Listening last Saturday The economy in question I reached the stage of fed up. For the umpteenth time, the fantasy of deindustrialization-who-causes-the-decline was convened ad nauseam. Nicolas Baverez was in full glee: he had said, and recent failures of French industrialists in Abu Dhabi and elsewhere in the evidence was striking. This fantasy, which seems to share any conservative man over 50 years, summed up in two propositions:
* A strong country is an industrial country.
* To maintain industrial competitiveness in globalization, we must know to contain labor costs.
France won because she failed to keep its costs. Germany succeeds because it has done the opposite.
This fantasy of désindustralisation is indeed a double fantasy of Germany. Germany, to believe Baverez is "the only European country favorably positioned in the global recovery because of its competitiveness and strength of its industry." Or, as he said Saturday "there is no inevitability to deindustrialization. An example is against Germany who managed to restore the competitiveness of the nation from its industry [...] thanks to the Agenda 2010 which was an impetus Reinvestment great but above control unit labor costs. "
Nothing could be further from the truth yet, or at least more questionable, as this double fantasy. Indeed, at first sight, it is the very opposite seems to be true: the ability of a country to maintain a constant share of GDP in the industrial field has no relationship or a negative relationship, with its economic dynamism, the German strategy is an almost complete failure, costly failure for the other European countries.
Let's start with the first proposal, therefore, who wants a developed country ought to be dynamically maintain a strong industrial base.
First, it must be remembered that industrial production has not declined in most developed countries. There is no de-industrialization in the sense that we produce each year fewer and fewer manufactured goods. The production of manufactured goods continues to rise in most developed countries, including France. But insofar as she thinks less quickly than production in other branches of GDP, its share in overall economic output decreases, sometimes sharply. Thus, in France, between 2000 and 2008, the value added in manufacturing rose 4.25% (and 30% between 1990 and 2008), while its place in the GDP declined sharply from 16% (18% in 1990) to 12%. Deindustrialization is relative, not absolute.
other hand, there is no evidence that the relative de-industrialization has a negative effect on the dynamism of an economy. Between 1990 and 2008, there is no link between the growth rate of an economy and the rate of change in the share of manufacturing in GDP.
Between 2000 and 2008, we see even show a negative relationship, although the correlation is low. Deindustrialized least one country has a relative point of view, the lower was its growth rate over the period. In other words, if we want to choose a strategy of specialization, there is no evidence that maintaining a constant proportion of its economic activity in the industrial field, as it reached Germany, is a good thing for a developed country. Quite the opposite seems true. In the case of Germany, this strategy has proved a failure: it has a growth rate of the lowest among all developed countries-even before the 2009 crisis, which has affected more than most other developed economies.
Clearly, while Asian countries become more competitive in the field, and the share of consumption devoted to industrial property continues to decline in all developed countries, there is probably better to do than willing, at all costs, to remain in the industry. And in any case, no evidence of the relevance of such a choice.
The rest of this post is here .
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