The fantasy is based in part on critical commercialism moron who joined industrialism thoughtless, takes the place of economic thought to many in France. This commercialism is a binary proposals: trade balance, though, trade deficit, bad. As its trade balance surplus is very, very, it's going very well for Germany. If one adds that it maintained a constant share of GDP in industry, so it has inserted her with competitiveness in globalization.
The problem is that mercantilism cretin ignores the fact that a trade surplus means nothing in itself: both in its causes and its consequences. There is no theoretical justification for the presence of a positive trade balance in any situation. In the case of Germany, the trade balance had a high economic cost. Not only for herself but also for other European countries.
We must start with an observation: contrary to what would commercialism moron, the huge German exports did not generate growth. On the contrary, since Germany has adopted the Agenda 2010 of regaining its competitiveness, economic growth has been anemic. Even before the 2009 recession, was one of the lowest in Europe.
Even in comparison with France, its growth rate is very low. Between 2000 and 2008, its GDP grew by only 10%. His economic recession in 2009 one of the most violent in the world finally reduced the rate of growth since 2000 to less than 5%. A decade almost white, yet one would like to pose as a success. Apart from Japan, no developed country has been as low growth over the period. At this initial observation, we can add other indicators of failure. Germany has not created jobs between 2000 and 2010. Before the crisis, in 2008, it was created less than France (3% more as against 6%). Between 2000 and 2008, its unemployment rate has not declined (7.5%), while that of France rose from 9% to 7.8%.
What happened? Germany has applied to the letter, wishing that the strategy to be competitive, we must lower the cost of labor. Thus, although it had less gains in productivity than France (12% in productivity per hour between 2000 and 2007, against 15% for France), the unit labor costs declined significantly, while that it increased in France.
When a company gains in productivity, it can do three things. It can increase wages. If it's growing as much as productivity gains, unit cost of labor, that is to say what it costs to pay compensation to produce a unit of a given product, remains constant. If it does not increase wages, unit labor cost declines and the company can then do two things: either lower its prices, redistributing gains in productivity to consumers, either increase its profits are redistributed, and that to its shareholders, the gains in productivity. (In fact, these three possibilities are combined in greater or lesser extent). German companies, encouraged by their government chose to increase only slightly wages. This enabled them, in 8 years, to lower the unit labor cost by over 10%. This corresponded to a strategy that set out Baverez: reclaiming the international price competitiveness by making possible lower prices made in Germany. This strategy of regaining price competitiveness is apparently a success, since the German trade balance was multiplied by 3 between 2000 and 2008, reaching nearly 180 billion euros (10% of the GDP of France).
But success is apparent. This strategy has, in fact, leads to break the internal dynamics of growth, which remains important for large countries like Germany, creating significant imbalances in the macroeconomic dynamics.
First, wages have hardly increased, while prices fell does not commensurate with productivity gains. German companies have considerably increased their profitability. It happened during the 2000s, a transformation of historic proportions in the distribution of value added in Germany.
margin rate increased by 6% points between 2000 and 2008 reaching a record high, while it remained stable in France. The profitability of German companies has increased significantly. However, these developments have led to anemic domestic demand to a level such that the increase in demand Exterior has been able to compensate. First, wage stagnation has caused a stagnation of consumption.
Moreover, contrary to what Baverez, carried away by the force of fantasy, the remarkable increase in the profitability of German companies has not led to a "tremendous momentum for reinvestment," but on the contrary. (The investment growth has even reached a level so low that it is worrying for the future of German competitiveness.) 
final sluggish consumption, coupled with the small rise in investment, resulted in a stagnation domestic demand, the rise in the trade balance has not compensated. The strategy to regain competitiveness by lowering the cost of labor is not a royal road, but a perilous path, because it threatens to break the internal macro dynamic equilibrium. In this perilous road, Germany has partly lost. Control its labor costs is not the miracle solution to globalization, contrary to what N. Baverez. This can not suffice, and it can even be dangerous.
But we must qualify by adding something decisive. Efforts in terms of labor costs Germany were much less rewarded as one might think. They were little with changes in the exchange rate of the euro. If we consider the unit labor costs in Germany in dollars, not euros, and thus taking into account changes in the exchange rate euro / dollar, it has indeed evolved very differently.
The cost of labor has not declined but increased considerably, by almost 40%, as the exchange rate of the euro against the dollar increased during the 2000s. This has led to a loss of price competitiveness of Germany outside the euro area and countries whose currencies are pegged to the euro. Because, contrary to what one reads almost always, the competitiveness of German industry has also been affected by significant revaluation of the euro.
The entire increase in its trade balance has made in Europe, particularly in the euro area. Its trade surplus with the rest of the world have declined since 2002, ie the same year that the value of the euro dollar began to rise, taking with him a price increase in dollar Made in Germany . And that's where it touches the bottom rear anti-cooperative in the European calendar 2010. With changes in the exchange rate euro / dollar, the area where Germany could preferentially increase its trade balance is the euro, since, by definition, the exchange rate is no impact.
But it is a basic truth in international economics: while the trade surplus to a deficit counterpart. For a country to have surplus, you have that others are in deficit. In other words, seeking trade surpluses, the price of a stagnant demand Indoor, Germany has pursued a strategy of counter-cooperative in other European countries. She received less growth, and has widened the trade imbalances in the euro area. The trade deficit of France is partly caused by this strategy. But it pales in relation to that of Greece or Spain. The deficits of these countries have certainly been fed by internal dynamics (including speculative Spain), which are the primary cause. But they are also the ones who in part made possible the German trade surplus. And now that these deficits lead to a massive financial crisis, Germany is refusing to pay, and do finally made that given the evidence of risk.
This strategy of competitiveness by lowering the cost of labor is not a setback for Germany: it is also a failure for the other European countries, and even more deeply for European integration, in it reveals a profound inability to macroeconomic coordination at European level against national egoism.
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