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The Great Schools, Universities and scholarships by Marc Bloch

analyzing the causes of the defeat of 1940, reads the Marc Bloch , 70 years ago. Any resemblance to contemporary situations can not be coincidental.

Some earlier systems [governments] had kept several large public bodies that they were far from head closely. Without doubt, considerations of party not wanting to intervene, often enough, in the selection of team leaders. Whichever way the wind blew at the time, they imposed designations were rarely the happiest. But the recruitment base was almost exclusively corporate.

Asylum favorite son of notable, the School of Political Science peopled with his students embassies, the Court of Auditors, the State Council, the Inspectorate of Finance. The École Polytechnique, which will build the benches are for life, the bonds of a wonderful solidarity, not only provide the staffs of the industry and it gave access to these careers of engineers state, where advancement obeys the laws of a quasi-mechanical automation. Universities, by means of a whole set of boards and committees, is co-opted almost entirely themselves, not without some dangers for the renewal of thought, that the present system has, temporarily, he said, abolished . [...]

The scheme had he right or wrong in respecting these ancient corporations? It can hold forth to the eye. Some will say, stability, tradition of honor. The other, to which I confess tilt, replied: routine, bureaucracy, arrogance collective. [...]

certainly would have been better promote, through grants, access to all administrative functions and refer to preparations universities, by broad general education system is the strength of British Civil Service .

Marc Bloch, strange defeat The , 1940 (pp. 191 and 192 of the Folio edition).

(Readers resident in countries where legislation on copyright is not as absurdly protective in France can find an electronic version of the book on Free Ebooks Free . PP are cited. 158 and 159 of the PDF version.)

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A Decade dishonest

I sit in One Of The Maldives were
Fifty-second Street Uncertain and
afraid
As The clever expires Hopes Of a low dishonest
decade (WH Auden)

The decade that just ended was certainly missed honesty: the decade of the Big Zero to resume Paul Krugman's words, where growth expectations have fallen into the worst recession in 70 years.

This decade has been built on two promises :

1. Liberalization of economies and financialisation would have to break the slow growth after 1973. The acceleration of productivity clearly discernible in the late 1990s in the United States suggested a strong growth for developed countries that have successfully made the structural changes needed to take advantage. Moreover, globalization seemed to emerge throughout the Third World underdevelopment.

2. The Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s heralded a greater instability. However, it was only the price to pay for higher growth. Less regulation meant more growth, but also more volatility. We chose a new arbitration more favorable to growth.

These hopes were not fulfilled. They are, in particular, broken on the worst recession experienced by the capitalist system for 70 years. Examine in detail how these promises have been betrayed.

First, global growth has indeed accelerated in the 2000s, but it is far from having recovered its pace of post-war boom.

Especially the finding must be heavily qualified, depending on the type of economy. The promise of faster growth were in fact disappointed for all economies, with the exception of emerging economies and developing countries.



Growth, particularly for developed economies slowed, continuing a trend that is now ancient. The annual growth rate has been twice as low as 20 years ago.

In fact, apart from Asia, and particularly China, growth has been weaker than in previous decades around the world. However, China has achieved this growth by skewing the liberalization of economies that had to be the cause. It never did and liberalized capital movements. She has consistently undervalued its currency, pursuing a mercantilist policy aggressively. Its development is, on the other hand, based on a series of imbalances, internal and external, who question its sustainability. In particular, imbalances in trade balances with the United States does not seem viable, lasting from not least in their current form.

Thus, only the emerging economies have seen their growth accelerate. In contrast, for other economies, particularly the more developed, growth has slowed. The mode of growth, leaving a more important financial activities, and based on a reduction of regulations, has not led to more growth, but at least-and even before the crisis of 2008-2009. This is particularly the case for leading the economy: the United States.

Without even taking into account 2009, the 2000s saw the growth of GDP per capita over the lowest since World War II: nearly half that during the 1960s. Hopes for an acceleration of growth occurred from the mid-1990s have broken over two recessions (2001 and 2008-2009), followed by weak recovery.

If we consider the main factor in the long term growth, increased productivity, the situation is only slightly less negative:

The 2000s had opened in the U.S. on a big hope: between 1995 and 2000, productivity growth found its level of post-war boom, after a deceleration brutal was the main cause of slower growth in the late 1970s. However, in the 2000s, productivity gains have again fallen. They are now, again, weaker than during the war boom, although they remain significantly higher than during the previous two decades.

We do not have refereed more growth to less stability. This is obviously the case for the United States:

We see that economic cycles were smoothed from the 1990s, while the growth rate tended to decline. More importantly: recessions are less numerous, and it takes a lot more time than before to return to trend growth rate. Recessions are, in other words, much longer. The economy has lost resilience. If so, is because it is their nature has changed: they are the result of profound imbalances in the economy (recession of 2001 or current) and not higher interest rates The Fed, facing a rise in inflation (recession of 1980).

With the 2000s, so we leave a world of false hopes. The acceleration growth in the late 1990s had led to expect a return to strong economic growth. The new regulation of the economy, less regulated, was meant to reinvigorate the Western economies, and promote the development of PVD. The promise was kept for emerging Asia. For all others, and especially for the most developed countries, it has not happened. The growth rate downward trend even before the crisis. And the crisis that ended the growth cycle of the mid-2000 presents an accentuated form of previous crises: brutal, long, because it is based on deep imbalances. But these imbalances, particularly the private sector debt, have fueled the growth.

This shows the magnitude of the task that opens with the 2010s, but we have an intellectual model for the completed deal, because it is, in part, the hopes of understanding most of macroeconomics that have been betrayed.

Phrase Congratulation Forwedding

Bankruptcy Greek aid of France

One wonders severely in World and Moreover, the effects of degradation of the rating of government debt by rating agencies.

In this notation, we can not mean much, since it involves the application of valuation methods opaque to the public accounts even more opaque, which would increase Enron for a model of rigor and integrity. We remember for example that 3 years ago, the Greeks decided to become richer 25% overnight by the grace of creative accounting: integrating an estimate of the underground economy in GDP. This single story speaks volumes about the value of the Greek government accounts. Since Enron, there remains only the truth of the cash flow to judge in these circumstances: while the Greek state is afloat, so it all goes well. For the rest, it is not just not. Although some manage to pay handsomely to their ignorance.

This is, cons, sure is that The World wrong to pay, as usual, in the tragic record of deficit-that-will-take-all-we-especially-if-you -must-pay-in-more-for-Greeks. For now, all that is favorable to the French State and its debt.

Why? The reason is simple: there is plenty of liquidity in financial markets. Even if fear is not what it was, the flight to quality has not ceased: investors want of course. And of course, this remains the state public debt seriously. But France is a country seriously. Thus bond prices of the French state has dropped significantly last fall as financial players sold securities unsafe (private) to buy safe government debt, including the French.


The same mechanism is currently taking place: the larger the debt of Greece is risky (as well as some other countries), the more it turns away more investors are moving toward what he are more secure: the debt of states like France.

The interest rates on bonds of the Greek state are negatively correlated with those of French government debt.

thing more astonishing, the current crisis of confidence does not benefit more to Germany than to France. Generally, in such circumstances, the German state is the big winner: nothing seems safer than him. If you buy more French debt, we buy more of the German and the gap between the two interest rate increases, lowering one more than the other. That's what happened in September last year, until January. Here, nothing such spreads even tend to decrease.


Financial markets are certain of one thing: France does not shoed bankruptcy. This is great news: we can continue to finance our debt on the cheap. Let's be optimistic, perhaps even that this will convince them that France is not about to go bankrupt. If financial markets are willing to lend to the interest rate the lowest in decades, is that they must know what they are - not ?